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Abstract—Each participant in peer-to-peer network prefers to
free-ride on the contribution of other participants. Reputation
based resource sharing is a way to control the free riding.
Instead of classical game theory we use evolutionary game theory
to analyse the reputation based resource sharing in peer to
peer system. Classical game-theoretical approach requires global
information of the population. However, the evolutionary games
only assumes light cognitive capabilities of users, that is, each user
imitates the behavior of other user with better payoff. We find
that without any extra benefit reputation strategy is not stable
in the system. We also find the fraction of users who calculate
the reputation for controlling the free riding in equilibrium.
In this work first we made a game theoretical model for the
reputation system and then we calculate the threshold of the
fraction of users with which the reputation strategy is sustainable
in the system. We found that in simplistic conditions reputation
calculation is not evolutionarily stable strategy but if we impose
some initial payment to all users and then distribute that payment
among the users who are calculating reputation then reputation
is evolutionary stable strategy.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Evolutionary Game Theory, peer-
to-peer network, Reputation system
I. INTRODUCTION
PEER-TO-PEER systems are autonomous and distributeddynamic resource-sharing networks. Collectively, the re-
sources of many autonomous users builds an economic and
highly scalable platform for data-sharing, storage and dis-
tributed computing etc. In these systems, it is peremptory for
peers to voluntarily contribute resources which includes stor-
age, bandwidth and data content etc. However, instinctively,
each peer would prefer to ”free ride” on the part of other
peers by consuming available resources and services without
contributing anything back, and thus avoid the corresponding
costs. It was reported that nearly 70% of Gnutella users share
nothing with other users (these users simply free-ride on other
users who share information), and nearly 50% of all file search
responses come from the top 1% of information sharing nodes
[1]. In a follow-up study (5 yr later), it was found that 85% of
users share nothing [2], which implies the free-riding problem
had got worse in the intervening years.
Generally, the lack of cooperation and so free riding is a
major problem in these autonomous resource sharing networks
[3], [4], [5]. Designer of P2P system can consider either of
two ways for resource management in these systems: resource
allocation in which the designer should decide whether and
what percentage of a good (with given predefined capacity)
each peer should consume and resource provision in which the
designer’s task is to entice independent participant to provide
resource (with its right share).
Both mechanisms in a way or other use the reputation of the
peers. Ideally, reputation should be the measure of cooperative
behavior of a node which is an abstract quantity and a private
information of a node. So, it is difficult to measure the
cooperative behavior of a node and we can only measure its
implications with some degree of uncertainty. However, it can
be estimated with certain accuracy on the basis of behavior
observed by a node. A number of mechanisms have been
proposed in literature [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15] for calculation of reputation.
A considerable amount of work has already been done
on resource allocation [19], [20] and resource provisioning
[26] using reputation. Reputation based resource allocation
mechanisms play a crucial role to encourage cooperation
among autonomous nodes. Research till now reveals that
reputation calculation is useful to entice the cooperation, but
the evolutionary stability of the reputation system is yet to be
investigated.
In this work, we have analyzed the reputation system for
understanding the conditions of evolutionary stability of the
system. Reputation systems always tend to give more benefit
to those nodes which are contributing more to the system.
But as calculation of reputation of the node requires some
cost so, cooperators (C strategy users) who are not calculating
reputation always gets more benefit when they interact with
reputation calculators (R) as compare to R users when they
interact with another R users. Due to this R strategy is not
evolutionary stable strategy if there is not extra benefit. In this
work, we have analyzed a payment based mechanism which
gives the required benefit to the reputation strategy so that
it could be evolutionary stable. In our work, for the sake of
simplicity we considered only discrete value full contribution,
full defection and reputation calculation with full contribution
as a strategic choice. Main findings of this paper are listed as
follows:
1) The threshold of the number of ‘reputation calculator’
R strategy users which if keep fixed then cooperators
always gets higher payoff than defectors and so ‘free
riding’ can be controlled.
2) The threshold of the number of R strategy users which
if keep fixed then reputation strategy users always gets
higher payoff than defectors.
3) If we allow reputation as the optional strategy then in
general conditions (without any extra benefit to R and C
strategy users) R strategy is not an equilibrium strategy.
4) If we impose some initial payment and distribute that
initial payment among the players who are calculating
the reputation then reputation is evolutionary stable
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II. RELATED WORK
In literature a lot of study has been done for estimation
of reputation. Buragohain et.al. [6] take the ratio of resource
contributed by the node to the ratio of absolute measure of
contribution, whether they does not discuss the mechanism to
measure of contributions of a node by the receiving node. In
[7] the receiving node computes the trust value of a node on
the basis of received data in the transactions with the sending
node. Duttay et.al. [8] suggest that each node should provide
rating to the other node on the basis of service provided by
the user and then this rating is supervised by a group of users.
This scheme uses the reputation in the form of rating. In [9]
each node calculates reputation of other node on the basis of
service received from the other nodes depending upon number
of transactions done with those nodes, delay in the transactions
and the download speed. Andrade et.al. [10] calculates the
reputation of a node by taking the difference of resources
received from and provided to the node. In [11],[12],[13],[14]
and [15], a node adjusts the reputation of other node on the
basis of quality of transactions with that node. Eigen-Trust
[12] uses sum of positive and negative ratings, Peer-Trust [13]
normalises the rating on each transaction whereas Power-Trust
[14] uses Bayesian approach to calculate reputation locally.
Some resource allocation and resource provision schemes
using generosity level of the peers has been investigated.
Feldman et al.[16] estimated generosity of node as the ratio of
the service provided by the node to the service received by the
node. Nodes will be served as per their estimated generosity.
Kung et al. [17] proposed selection of a peer for allocation
of resource according to its contribution to the network and
usage of resources. Nodes desirous to receive resources have
to contribute above a certain level to the network. Meo et
al. [18] model the resource allocation problem as competition
among all requesters on the basis of resource request amount.
Resource is allocated to the requesters who are demanding
least. In this work author asumed all the requesters as generous
means: it does not want not to share, but to share as little
as possible. Later the term generosity level of the peer is
replaced by the reputation of the peer and some new resource
allocation and resource provision schemes worked on this.
In [19] Satsiou et al. proposes the distributed reputation-
based system. They propose the algorithm which maximizes
requesters satisfactions as well as maximizes the download
capacity of the user so as to its utility. In [20] Gupta et al. uses
the probabilistic approach to allocate the resources on the basis
of reputation. They argue that by using this scheme nodes that
don’t have very good reputation about each other, may also
serve each other at least some amount of resource with finite
probability. For avoiding whitewashing in unstructured peer to
peer to network Gupta et al in [21] proposes a reputation based
resource allocation mechanism in which the initial reputation
is adjusted according to the level of whitewashing in the
network. In [22] Lai et al. uses the decision function that takes
shared and subjective history of the previous interactions in
deciding whether to cooperate or defect with the requester. Ma
et al. in [23] proposes a water filling squared bucket algorithm.
In which the width of the bucket is the contribution level of the
user and the height is the required demand of the user. The
allocation is given on the basis of shorter height first. This
mechanism ensures the maximization of individual and social
utility. In [24] Ma et al. allocate the resources to the users on
the basis of their contribution level and requested bandwidth.
Yan et al. in [25] uses the contribution level as the ranking of
the user and allocate the resources on the basis of the ranking
of the user.
All of these schemes considered reputation calculation as
compulsory for all the nodes and on the basis of reputation
they impose their allocation scheme. But we in this work
analyze reputation calculation as a strategy of the user and
found that whether a lot of resource allocation mechanism has
been given but even reputation calculation is not an evolution-
ary stable strategy. For making reputation as an evolutionary
stable strategy we devise a mechanism for the autonomous
peer-to-peer system so that it could be an evolutionary stable
strategy. In [26] VPEF propose Evolutionary Game Theory
based mechanism, VPEF (Voluntary Principle and round-based
Entry Fee), to enforce cooperation in the society. In VPEF
author modeled the interaction among the users as public
goods game, whereas we modeled the interaction as two player
strategic game because all the reciprocation in peer-to-peer
network are pairwise interaction. Same as in VPEF we also
incorporate round based entry fees. VPEF highlights the role
of selection of different strategies whereas we highlight the
role of stability of strategies against mutation. In [27] author,
evolutionary game theoretically analysed the reputation strat-
egy in a mobile ad hoc network using simulation and as of their
strategic game reputation strategy is not evolutionarily stable
strategy. They are minimizing the possibilities of invading
of reputation strategy by always defect strategy. As of the
anonymous, autonomous and dynamic nature of the peer-to-
peer network author in [28] proposes the mechanism in which
some cooperators first behave like generous,and then like harsh
according to peers’ current behaviors. One of the weak-point
of the above scheme is whether the punisher will dominate the
system, but neither punishment nor cooperation is evolutionary
stable strategy.
III. MODELING OF REPUTATION SYSTEM AS A GAME
In this paper, we have used peer, user, node and agent
interchangeably. Peer-to-peer network has been assumed as
pure i.e., without any central server with total N number of
peers . We also assume that any two peers in the network can
interact with each other. A P2P system without any punishment
and reward mechanism can simply be modeled as famous
Prisoners’ Dilemma game in which defection always strictly
dominates cooperation strategy. The cooperation strategy can
only survive in the system when it can dominate the de-
fection strategy. In the reputation based resource allocation
mechanisms, reputation is calculated by the peers. Resources
are allocated to the resource requesting peers based on their
reputation.
Reputation management is a tool to punish the defectors but
on the cost of reputation calculation. Peers prefer to save this
3additional cost involved in reputation calculation. Therefore,
most of the cooperators does not calculate reputation and
only cooperate. If the fraction of reputation calculators in
the population comes to lower than a threshold, this leads
to the domination of defectors and consequent collapse of
system. The threshold can be calculated by modeling whole
situation as a strategic game. Although, a user can interact
with multiple other users at a time but as each interaction is
independent from other interactions, hence we can model all
these interactions as pairwise interaction game between two
users. We model this phenomena as a symmetric simultaneous
game where both players make their moves simultaneously.
A. General Reputation Game
Here peer’s strategy may be classified into three types
viz. Reputation Calculation with cooperation (R), Cooperation
(C), Defection (D). Users playing R strategy always provide
requested services as per the reputation of the requesters;
Users playing C strategy always provide the requested services
to all users; Users playing D strategy always deny any
requested service. Therefore, reputation system is modeled as
the strategic game.
Players:- User1, User2
Strategies:- Reputation Calculation with cooperation (R),
Cooperation (C), Defection (D)
Preferences
Ui(Ai, A−i) = (C l−i · (1−R l−i) +C li ·R l−i ·C l−i) · d
−(C li · (1−R li) +C l−i ·R li) · a−R li · α+
(C li ·R l−i) · β (1)
where Ai and A−i are the actions of player i and other
than player i respectively. C li is the cooperation level of
player i and Rli is the reputation calculation level of player i
respectively.
For C (cooperation) strategy : C l = 1 and Rl = 0. Because
these users are always cooperating and not calculating reputa-
tion. Similarly for R (reputation calculation with cooperation)
strategy : C l = 1 and Rl = 1, for D (defection) strategy :
C l = 0 and Rl = 0
In the preference function the first term represents the ‘benefit
of sharing’, the benefit of sharing resources can only be
obtained by first user when the second user is either cooperator
(C) or when the first player is either cooperator or reputation
calculator user (C and R) and second player is reputation
calculator (R) user. The second term represents the ‘cost of
sharing’, the cost of sharing will only be imposed when the
player is either cooperator or he is reputation calculator and
second player is cooperator. Third term represents the ‘cost
of reputation calculation’ which is always incurred when the
first user is reputation calculator (R) user. Fourth term is the
‘benefit of reputation increment’. The payoff matrix of the
game is illustrated in table I. In this matrix, row corresponds
to the possible actions of peer A whereas, column corresponds
to the possible actions of peer B and the values in each box
are the players’ payoffs to the action profile to which the box
corresponds, with A’s payoff listed first. Each first value aij of
this table symbolizes the payoff of A with strategy Si, when
TABLE I: Simplistic Model
R(B) C (B) D(B)
R (A)
d− a− α+ β,
d− a− α+ β
d− a− α,
d− a+ β −α,0
C (A) d− a+ β,d− a− α d− a,d− a −a,d
D (A) 0,−α d,−a 0,0
TABLE II: symbols used in modeling the reputation game
Symbol Definition
d Benefit received by getting the service from the cooperator
a The cost incurred due to providing the service to the other player
β The benefit received due to improving the reputation
α The cost incurred due to calculation of reputation
PR Average Payoff of R strategic Players
PC Average Payoff of C strategic Players
PD Average Payoff of D strategic Players
xi The proportion of peers with strategy i
nd Total number of D strategy users
nr Total number of R strategy users
nc Total number of C strategy users
p Round based payment payed by users
B opts for strategy Sj . Take the first value a12 for instance,
the value d− a− α is the payoff of A with R strategy when
B opts C strategy where a and α is the cost incurred due to
providing the service to the other player and the cost incurred
due to calculation of reputation respectively. In this α < a as
the ‘cost of reputation calculation’ is always less than ‘cost
of sharing’, otherwise R strategy users loss is more than C
strategy users when they play with D strategy users and so
will always prefer only to cooperate without calculation of
reputation.
If a user with R strategy meets a user with C strategy,
it will always grant a service to C strategy user and get a
service from the C strategy user. Thus, it would obtain a
benefit d−a. However, to calculate the reputation of the peers,
the user with R strategy has to communicate to the other peers
for information. So it has to bear an extra cost α. Therefore,
the total payoff of user with R strategy in this transaction is
d − a − α. In this d > a as the benefit received by shared
data is always greater than the cost of sharing. Now consider
the second value b12 that is the payoff of A with C strategy
when B opts R strategy. If a user with C strategy meets a user
with R strategy it will always grant service and get a service
from the R strategy user. Thus, it would obtain a benefit d−a.
However, due to its cooperative behavior its reputation would
also increase, so it would get the extra benefit for reputation
increment β. Therefore, the total payoff of a user with C
strategy in this transaction is d− a+ β.
Analysis:- In this game if R strategy user interacts with
D strategy user, then he gets payoff −α and if C strategy
user interacts with D strategy user, then he gets payoff −a
which are less than 0. This shows that users does not have
higher payoff in unilaterally deviation from profile (D,D).
Therefore (D,D) is the pure strategic strict Nash equilibrium
4and consequently D is the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
U1(D,D) > U1(x,D) (2)
where x is any strategy other than D.
Let us assume that the population fraction of R, C and
D strategies are xR, xC , and (1 − xR − xC) respectively.
Therefore, the average payoff of each strategy is written as
PR = d · (xR + xC)− a · (xR + xC) + xR · β − α (3)
PC = d · (xR + xC)− a+ xR · β (4)
PD = xC · d. (5)
From the above equations following observations can be made.
• If the reputation calculation cost α is assumed to be
negligible, then the expected payoff for R strategy users
will always be greater than the C strategy users till there
are D strategy users as in this case xR + xC is less than
1 and it will be equal when there is no D strategy user
• The payoff received by R strategy will be higher than
the D strategy i.e., PR > PD when xR >
a·(xR+xC)+α
(d+β)
i.e., when fraction of R strategy user is greater than
the ratio of total expected cost incurred to R strategy
users by population and individual benefit received by
R strategy user when played with R strategy user. The
payoff received by C strategy will be higher than the D
strategy i.e., PC > PD when xR > a(d+β) i.e., when the
fraction of R strategy user is greater than the ratio of total
expected cost payed by C strategy user and individual
benefit received by C strategy user when played with R
strategy user.
• If fraction of R strategy users are lesser than both the ratio
mentioned above, then the payoff of D strategy users
becomes highest in the population and therefore users
imitates to D strategy, because now PD > PR and PD >
PC .
• The payoff to R strategy users will be higher than C and
D strategy when PR > PC and PR > PD i.e., xD >
α
a i.e., when the fraction of D strategy users is greater
than the ratio of cost of reputation calculation and cost
of sharing, and also when xR >
a·(xR+xC)+α
(d+β) .
We have already examined pure strategy equilibrium now let
us examine the mixed strategy equilibriums of the game.
Existence of mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium For the
mixed strategy equilibrium first we will examine the mixed
strategy with any two strategies, then we will take the combi-
nation of all three strategies.
Let us consider the combination of two strategies. First take
C and R strategy. In this combination C always dominates
the R strategy which is then dominated by the D strategy.
If we take C and D strategy, then D always dominates the
C strategy. If we take R and D strategy, then although in
this combination R and D strategy is in itself pure strategy
Nash equilibrium but only D strategy fulfills the condition for
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the presence of C strategy.
This two strategy combination provides another mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium with zero payoff. The equilibrium can be
obtained by solving following equations.
xR · (d− a− α+ β) + (−α) · (1− xR) = 0 (6)
By this equality we got
xR =
α
(d− a+ β) (7a)
xC = 0 (7b)
xD = 1− α
(d− a+ β) (7c)
The second mixed strategy equilibrium 7 is only possible when
the payoff of C strategy with the above combination is less
than or equal to the payoff of R and D strategy users i.e.,
PC <= 0 i.e., (d− β) ≥ a2a−α . This equilibrium leads to zero
payoff so this is not useful from system designer perspective.
Now we will analyze the mixed strategy equilibrium with all
three strategy.
For mixed strategic equilibrium with all three strategies:
xR · (d− a− α+ β) + xC · (d− a− α) + (1− xR − xC) ·
(−α) = xR · (d− a+ β) + xC · (d− a) + (1− xR − xC) ·
(−a) = xR · 0 + xC · d+ (1− xR − xC) · 0 (8)
By this equality we got
xR =
a
d+ β
(9a)
xC =
(d+ β)(a− α)− a2
(d+ β) · a (9b)
xD = 1− xR − xC = α
a
(9c)
1) Theoretical Analysis of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium with
All Three Strategies: In this game, (D,D) is a strict Nash
equilibrium but this equilibrium state leads to no sharing from
all the peers and results in collapse of the system. The only
equilibrium state which allow the survival of the system is
polymorphic mixed strategy equilibrium depicted by equation
(9). In this section we analyzed the mixed strategy equilibrium
equation for varying a single parameter value (viz. d, a, α, β)
while other parameters remain fixed.
By this analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium in equation
9 following things can be observed:-
• With the increment in ‘cost of the reputation calculation’
α, D strategy users increases, C strategy users decreases
and R strategy users remains same in resulting mixed
strategy equilibrium
• With the increment in ‘cost of sharing’ a , R strategy
users increases, D strategy users decreases.
• With the increment in ‘benefit of sharing’ d, C strategy
users increases, R strategy users decreases and D strategy
users remains same in resulting mixed strategy equilib-
rium.
• With the increment in ‘benefit of reputation increment’ β
the fraction of R strategy users decreases, fraction of C
strategy users decreases and fraction of D strategy users
remains constant.
The reasoning behind first observation is that as ‘cost of
reputation calculation’ α increases, then the payoff to R
strategy users decreases and therefore the R strategy becomes
less lucrative to the users so they switches to C strategy
and D strategy users. As R strategy users decreases and
5(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1: Fraction of population in mixed Nash equilibrium
for the network (a) vs benefit of shared data d with other
parameters{ a = 3, α = 3, β = 4, p = 0.5} (b)vs cost of
reputation calculation α with other parameters {d = 8, a = 3,
β = 4, p = 0.5} (c)vs cost of sharing a with other parameters
{d = 8, α = 2, β = 4, p = 0.5}
C strategy users increases, then the payoff to C strategy
users also decreases and payoff to D strategy users increases.
Due to this the C strategy users also switches to D strategy
users. As D strategy users increases the payoff to C strategy
users decreases more and comes to lower than R strategy.
Due to this C strategy users now switches to R strategy
till the payoff of all the strategy equalizes. Due to this in
new equilibrium D strategy users increases, C strategy users
decreases and R strategy users remains same as shown in
figure 1b. The reasoning behind second observation is that
as ‘cost of sharing’ a increases, then the payoff of R and
C strategy users decreases. Due to this most of the R and
C strategy users switches to D strategy users. As C strategy
users decreases the payoff to D strategy also decreases and so
D strategy users also switches to R strategy. As R strategy
users increases the payoff to C strategy users increases and
so D strategy users also switches to C strategy. Due to this in
final equilibrium R strategy users increases, D strategy users
decreases.
The reasoning behind third observation is, at one equilib-
rium state when the expected payoff of all the three strategies
are same, then as benefit of shared data increases the expected
payoff of R user and C user increases equally whereas the
expected payoff of D user increases xR fraction lesser than
R and C strategy users. Due to this D strategy users switches
to C strategy users and R strategy users equally. But as the
fraction xR and xC increases, then the expected payoff of
reputation R users increases lesser than expected payoff of C
strategy users and as fraction of C strategy users increases
the expected payoff to D strategy users also increases. So R
strategy users switches to cooperation and defection users. As
xR decreases the payoff to C strategy users also decreases
so C strategy users switches to D strategy. This drift process
comes with next equilibrium state in which R strategy users
decreases, C strategy users increases and D strategy users
remains same as shown in figure 1a.
The reasoning behind fourth observation is same as the
‘benefit of shared resources’. In this as the ‘benefit of rep-
utation increment’ β would increase the expected payoff of
reputation and C strategy users would increase whereas the
expected payoff of D strategy users remain same. Due to
this D strategy users switches to R and C strategy users. As
the C strategy users increases the payoff of D strategy users
again increases. As the fraction of reputation and cooperation
increases the expected payoff of R users increases lesser
than C strategy. So R strategy users switches to D and C
strategy users and in next equilibrium D strategy users remain
unchanged and fraction of R strategy users decreases and
fraction of C strategy users increases.
B. Reputation system with round based initial payment dis-
tributed to cooperative users
In the previous subsection, we have analyzed the reputation
system in which there is no initial payment required for the
peers. Now in this subsection we will analyze the reputation
system with round based initial payment imposed to the peers,
which is distributed among the cooperation and reputation with
cooperation peers (C and R strategy). The game can be defined
as follows.
Players:- User1, User2
Strategies:- Reputation with cooperation (R), Cooperation
(C), Defection (D)
Preferences
Ui(Ai, A−i) = (C l−i · (1−R l−i) +C li ·R l−i ·C l−i) · d
−(C li · (1−R li) +C l−i ·R li) · a−R li · α+
(C li ·R l−i) · β +C li · N · p
N − nd − p
where Ai and A−i are the actions of player i and player other
than i respectively. C li is the cooperation level of player i and
Rli is the reputation calculation level of player i respectively.
For C (cooperation) strategy : C l = 1 and Rl = 0. Because
these users are always cooperating and not calculating reputa-
tion. Similarly for R (reputation calculation) strategy : C l = 1
and Rl = 1 and for D (defection) strategy : C l = 0 and Rl = 0
In the preference function the first term represents the benefit
of sharing, the benefit of sharing the resources can only be
obtained by first user when the second user is either cooperator
(C) or when the first player is either cooperator or reputation
calculator user (C and R) and second player is reputation
calculator (R) user. The second term represents the ‘cost of
sharing’, the cost of sharing will only be imposed when the
player is either cooperator or he is reputation calculator and
second player is cooperator. Third term represents the cost of
reputation calculation cost which is always incurred when the
first user is reputation calculator (R) user. Fourth term is the
benefit of reputation increment. Fifth term is the benefit due
6TABLE III: Initial Payment With Distribution To Cooperative
Users
R(B) C (B) D(B)
R (A)
d− a− α+ β+
nd·p
nr+nc
,
d− a− α+ β+
nd·p
nr+nc
d− a− α+
nd·p
nr+nc
,
d− a+ β+
nd·p
nr+nc
nd·p
nr+nc
− α,−p
C (A)
d− a+ β+
nd·p
nr+nc
,
d− a− α+
nd·p
nr+nc
d− a+ nd·p
nr+nc
,
d− a+ nd·p
nr+nc
−a+ nd·p
nr+nc
,
d− p
D (A) −p, nd·p
nr+nc
− α
d− p,
−a+ nd·p
nr+nc
−p,−p
to initial payment distribution. Payoff matrix of the game is
shown in table III.
Analysis In this game we claim that
if p ≥ a · (1− nd
N
) (10)
then cooperation strategy profile i.e., (C,C) will be the Nash
equilibrium and
if p > a · (1− nd
N
) (11)
then cooperation strategy profile will be Evolutionarily stable
strategy.
If the condition in equation 10 is not fulfilled and
if p < α · (1− nd
N
) (12)
then the defection strategy profile i.e., (D,D) will be the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium profile.
The argument for strategy profile (C,C) as Nash equilib-
rium, given condition (10), is as follows.
We can observe that if condition (10) is true, then U1(C,C) ≥
U1(D,C) and U1(C,C) ≥ U1(R,C) that means the payoff
of cooperation strategy when played with itself is always
greater than or equal to other two strategy while played with
cooperation.
The argument for strategy profile (C,C) as Evolutionary
Stable, given condition (11), is as follows.
We can observe that if condition (11) is true, then U1(C,C) >
U1(D,C) and U1(C,C) > U1(R,C) that means the payoff of
cooperation strategy when played with itself is always strictly
greater than D and R strategy while played with C strategy.
The argument for strategy profile (D,D) as Nash equilibrium
as well as Evolutionary stable, given condition (12), is as
follows
We can observe that if condition (12) is true, then U1(D,D) >
U1(R,D) and U1(D,D) > U1(C,D) that means the payoff
of Defection strategy when played with itself is always greater
than R and C strategy when played with D strategy.
If condition 10 and 12 is not satisfied, then there is no pure
strategic Nash equilibrium in this game. Therefore, now we
will compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile. For
this the expected payoff of each strategy can be written as
PR = d · (xR + xC)− a · (xR + xC) + xR · β − α+ nd · p
N − nd
(13a)
PC = d · (xR + xC) + xR · β − a+ nd · p
N − nd (13b)
PD = xC · d− p (13c)
First we will consider the mixed strategy in the combination
of two strategies. If we take the combination of only R
and C strategies, then in this combination C strategy always
dominates R, so no mixed strategy equilibrium exist. Now
we consider the combination of R and D strategies, then if
condition (12) is not fulfilled, this results in the domination
of R strategy over D strategy and hence again mixed strategy
equilibrium does not exist. But if condition (12) is fulfilled,
then there exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium which can
be obtained by equating the expected payoffs of R and D
strategy users such that,
xR · (d− α− a+ β + nd · p
N − nd ) + (1− xR) ·
(
nd · p
N − nd − α) = −p
xR · (d− a+ β) = α− p ·N
N − nd (14)
xR =
α− p · ( NN−nd )
(d− a+ β) (15a)
xC = 0 (15b)
xD = 1−
α− p · ( NN−nd )
(d− a+ β) (15c)
This equilibrium leads to negative payoff so this is not useful
from system designer perspective.
Now we consider the combination of C and D strategy.
If condition 11 is fulfilled, then C strategy dominates D
strategy and so no mixed strategy equilibrium presents. But if
p = a · (1− ndN ), then U1(C,C) = U1(D,C) and U1(C,D) =
U1(D,D). So at this condition although cooperation is pure
strategic weak Nash equilibrium, but as D strategy users are
also getting the same payoff so there exist a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium which can be obtained by equating the
payoff of D and C strategy users such that,
xC · (d− a+ nd · p
N − nd ) + (1− xC) · (−a+
nd · p
N − nd ) =
xC · (d− p) + (1− xC) · (−p) (16)
this drift would be there till the payoff of reputation strategy
is lesser than these two strategies i.e.,
xC · (d− a+ nd · p
N − nd ) + (1− xC) · (−a+
nd · p
N − nd ) >
xC · (d− a− α+ nd · p
N − nd ) + (1− xC) · (−α+
nd · p
N − nd )
(17)
7By solving above inequality we get
xD <
α
a
(18)
This shows that till the fraction of defectors remains lesser
than the ratio of reputation cost and cost of sharing, reputation
users will not be there in the system. This is because when
the defectors are less in the society, then paying the reputation
cost seems less useful. But as defectors increase, the payoff
to reputation strategy increases and users mutates to the
reputation strategy.
Now we will find out the mixed strategy with all the three
strategies. For this equilibrium, the expected payoff to all three
strategies should be equal.
(d− a− α+ β + nd · p
N − nd ) · xR + (d− a− α
+
nd · p
N − nd ) · xC + (
nd · p
N − nd − α)(1− xR − xC)
= (d− a+ β + nd · p
N − nd ) · xR + (d− a+
nd · p
N − nd ) · xC
+(−a+ nd · p
N − nd )(1− xR − xC)
= (−p) · xR + (d− p) · xC + (1− xR − xC) · (−p) (19)
By solving above equality
xD =
α
a
(20a)
xR =
(a− p · ( NN−nd ))
d+ β
(20b)
xC =
(a− α)
a
− a− p · (
N
N−nd )
(d+ β)
(20c)
Putting this fraction of D strategy users in the fraction of
reputation and cooperation strategy we got
xR =
(a− p · ( aa−α ))
d+ β
(21a)
xC =
(a− α)
a
− a− p · (
a
a−α )
(d+ β)
(21b)
In this mixed strategy equilibrium described by (20), fol-
lowing things can be observed:-
• With the increment in ‘cost of the reputation calculation’
α, D strategy users increases, C and R strategy users
decreases in resulting mixed strategy equilibrium
• With the increment in ‘cost of sharing’ a, R strategy users
increases whereas D strategy users decreases in resulting
mixed strategy equilibrium
• The fraction of R strategy is inversely proportional to
‘initial payment’ p whereas the fraction of C strategy
users is directly proportional to p. Moreover, the mixed
strategy equilibrium is not defined for p greater than a ·
(1− xD)
• The fraction of R strategy users decreases, fraction of C
strategy users increases and fraction of D strategy users
remain same with the increment in ‘benefit of reputation
increment’ β
The reasoning of first observation is, as the ‘cost of the
reputation calculation’ α increases, the expected payoff to R
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 2: parameter vs Fraction of population in mixed Nash
equilibrium for the network with (a) vs cost of sharing a with
other parameters {d = 8, α = 2, β = 4, p = 0.5} (b) vs cost
of reputation calculation alpha with other parameters {d = 8,
a = 3, β = 4, p = 0.5} (c) vs benefit of reputation increment
with other parameters { d = 8, α = 2, a = 3, p = 0.5} (d) vs
round based initial payment p with other parameters {β = 4,
α = 2, a = 3, d = 8}
strategy users decreases so they switches to cooperation and
defection users. As the cooperation increases the payoff to D
strategy users increases and as R strategy users decreases the
payoff to C strategy users also decreases so C strategy users
also switches to D strategy. As D strategy users increases the
payoff to reputation and cooperation users slightly increases
because now they are getting benefit of the payment p. As
defection increases and cooperation decreases the payoff to
defection also decreases and so they switches to R strategy
users. As R strategy users increases the payoff to C strategy
users increases so some D strategy users now switches to
cooperation. This whole process shifts the equilibrium where
xR and xC decreases and xD increases. Unlike previous
game in this game fraction of R strategy users decreases
as α increases because as defection increases the payoff to
cooperation also increases due to payment so some R strategy
users switches to cooperation in equilibrium as shown in
figure 2b
The reasoning behind second observation is, as ‘cost of
sharing’ a increases, the expected payoff to R and C strategy
users decreases, but the payoff to C strategy users decreases
more so C strategy users switches to D strategy users which
currently has highest payoff. As the fraction of C strategy
users decreases the expected payoff to D strategy users also
decreases and it comes to lowest. So now D strategy users
switches to C strategy users and R strategy users. Like
previous game in this game the next equilibrium comes at
point where fraction of R strategy users increases and fraction
8of D strategy users decreases but as compare to previous
game the rate of change is low because now the R strategy
users also getting benefit of the payment from D strategy
users.
The reasoning behind third observation is, as the ‘initial
payment’ p increases, the expected payoff of C and R strategy
users increases whereas the expected payoff to D strategy
users(d ·xC−p) decreases. As the payoff to R and C strategy
users increases the D strategy users switches to R and C
strategy users. As D strategy users decreases and R strategy
users increases the payoff to C strategy users increases more
than R strategy users due to this R strategy users switches to C
strategy users. As R strategy users decreases and C strategy
users increases the payoff to D strategy users increases so
some R and C strategy users switches to D strategy. Due to
this process fraction of R strategy users decreases, C strategy
users increases and D strategy users remains same in new
Nash equilibrium as shown in Figure 2d. If the initial payment
satisfies the condition 11 i.e., C strategy is evolutionary stable,
then mixed strategy equilibrium is not defined and hence, it
can be observed in figure 2d that the R strategy users fraction
becomes negative for initial payment greater than a · (1−xD)
i.e., 0.99.
The reasoning behind fourth observation is, as the ‘benefit
of reputation’ β increases the expected payoff of C and R
strategy users increase equally whereas the expected payoff of
D strategy users remain same. Due to this D strategy users
switches to R and C strategy users. As the fraction of R
strategy users increases and D strategy users decreases, the
payoff of C strategy users increases more than R strategy
users so R strategy users also switches to C strategy. As C
strategy users increases the payoff of D strategy users again
increases and C and R strategy users also switches to D
strategy. Due to this whole process fraction of R strategy users
decreases, fraction of C strategy users increases and fraction
of D strategy users remain same in the new Nash equilibrium
as shown in Figure 2c.
C. Reputation system with round based initial payment dis-
tributed to reputation calculator R users
In the last subsection, we have analyzed the reputation
system in which initial payment is distributed among the
cooperation and reputation with cooperation peers (C and
R strategy). Now, in this subsection, we will analyze the
reputation system with round based initial payment imposed
to the peers, which is distributed among only reputation (R)
strategy users. The game can be defined as follows.
Players:- User1, User2
Strategies:- Reputation with cooperation (R), Cooperation
(C), Defection (D)
Preferences
ui(Ai, A−i) = (C l−i · (1−R l−i) +C li ·R l−i ·C l−i) · d
−(C li · (1−R li) +C l−i ·R li) · a−R li · α+
(C li ·R l−i) · β +R li ·C li · N · p
N − nd − p (22)
TABLE IV: Initial Payment with Distribution To Reputation
Users
R(B) C (B) D(B)
R (A)
d− a− α+ β+
(N−nr)·p
nr
,
d− a− α+ β+
(N−nr)·p
nr
d− a− α+
(N−nr)·p
nr
,
d− a+ β − p (N−nr)·p
nr
− α,−p
C (A)
d− a+ β − p,
d− a− α+
(N−nr)·p
nr
d− a− p,
d− a− p −a− p,d− p
D (A) −p, (N−nr)·p
nr
− α d− p,−a− p −p,−p
where A1 and A2 are the actions of player 1 and player 2
respectively. C li is the cooperation level of player i and Rli
is the reputation calculation level of player i respectively.
For C (cooperation) strategy : C l = 1 and Rl = 0. Because
these users are always cooperating and not calculating
reputation. Similarly
For R (reputation calculation) strategy : C l = 1 and Rl = 1
For D (defection) strategy : C l = 0 and Rl = 0
In the preference function the first term represents the benefit
of sharing, the benefit of sharing the resources can only
be obtained by first user when the second user is either
cooperator (C) or when the first player is either cooperator
or reputation calculator user (C and R) and second player is
reputation calculator (R) user. The second term represents the
cost of sharing, the cost of sharing will only be imposed when
the player is either cooperator or he is reputation calculator
and second player is cooperator. Third term represents the
cost of reputation calculation cost which is always incurred
when the first user is reputation calculator (R) user. Fourth
term is the benefit of reputation increment. Fifth term is the
benefit due to initial payment distribution. Payoff matrix of
the game is shown in table IV.
Analysis In this game
if p >
nr · α
N
(23)
then we claim that reputation (R) strategy will be pure strategic
strict Nash equilibrium and hence evolutionarily stable. Where
nr is the number of R strategy users in the population.
If (23) is not fulfilled and
if p <
nr · α
N
(24)
then we claim that D strategy is a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium, and hence evolutionarily stable.
The argument for strategy profile (R,R) as strict Nash
equilibrium, given condition (23), is as follows.
We can observe that if condition (23) is true, then
U1(R,R) > U1(C,R) and U1(R,R) ≥ U1(D,R) that
means the payoff of R strategy when played with itself is
always greater than or equal to other two strategy while
played with R.
The argument for strategy profile (D,D) as strict Nash
equilibrium, given condition (24), is as follows.
We can observe that if condition (24) is true, then
9U1(D,D) > U1(C,D) and U1(D,D) ≥ U1(R,D) that
means the payoff of D strategy when played with itself is
always greater than or equal to other two strategy while
played with D.
Now we will compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
profile. For this the expected payoff of each strategy can be
written as
PR = d · (xR + xC)− a · (xR + xC) + β · xR
+ p · N − nr
nr
− α (25a)
PC = d · (xR + xC) + β · xR − a− p (25b)
PD = d · xC − p (25c)
In this game if condition (23) is fulfilled, then no mixed strat-
egy equilibrium presents as R is strictly dominating strategy.
If this condition is not fulfilled, then we check for multiple
equilibrium in the system. Let us first take the combination
of C and D strategies. In this combination D strategy always
dominates the C strategy, hence no mixed strategy equilibrium
presents.
If we take the combination of R and D strategy, then if p =
nr·α
N , then (D,D) will be pure strategic weak Nash equilibrium
and (R,R) will be pure strategic strict Nash equilibrium. In
this condition no mixed strategy equilibrium presents. If the
condition is p < nr·αN , then the negative payoff mixed strategic
Nash equilibrium presents but this is of no use to the system
designers.
Now we take the combination of R and C strategies. In this
if p = nr·αN , then drift occurs among these two strategies and
it will be continued till the expected payoff of D strategy will
be less than the expected payoff to these strategies,
xR · (d− a+ β − α+ N − nr
nr
· p) + (1− xR) · (d− a− α
+
N − nr
nr
· p) > xR · (−p) + (1− xR) · (d− p) (26a)
By using above equation we got
xR >
a
d+ β
(27)
This means that when R strategy users are more in the
system, then playing D strategy will not be lucrative. In the
combination of R and C strategy if p < nr·αN , then C strategy
dominates R strategy and so no mixed strategy equilibrium
presents in this condition. Now let us take the combination
of all three strategies for the mixed strategy equilibrium. For
this, the equality is,
(d− a− α+ β + (N − nr) · p
nr
)xR + (d− a− α
+
(N − nr)p
nr
) · xC + ((N − nr) · p
nr
− α)(1− xR − xC)
= (d− a+ β − p)xR + (d− a− p) · xC +
(−a− p)(1− xR − xC) = (−p) · xR + (d− p) · xC
+(1− xR − xC) · (−p) (28)
By this equality we got
xR =
a
d+ β
(29a)
xC = 1−
α− p · Nnr
a
− a
d+ β
(29b)
xD =
α− p · Nnr
a
(29c)
In this mixed strategy equilibrium described by (29), following
things can be observed:-
• With the increment in ‘cost of the reputation calculation’
α, D strategy users increases, C strategy users decreases
and R strategy users remains same in resulting mixed
strategy equilibrium
• With the increment in ‘benefit of reputation increment’ β,
the fraction of R and D strategy users decreases whereas
fraction of C strategy users increases
• With the increment in the ‘initial payment’ p, the fraction
of D strategy users decreases, whereas the fraction of C
strategy users increases
• With the increment in ‘cost of sharing’ a, C strategy users
decreases, R and D strategy users increases in resulting
mixed strategy equilibrium.
The reasoning behind first observation is that as ‘cost of
reputation calculation’ α increases, then the payoff to R
strategy users decreases and therefore the R strategy becomes
less lucrative to the users so they switches to C strategy
and D strategy users. As R strategy users decreases and C
strategy users increases, then the payoff to C strategy users
also decreases and payoff to D strategy users increases. Due
to this the C strategy users also switches to D strategy users.
As D strategy users increases the payoff to C strategy users
decreases more and comes to lower than R strategy. Due to
this C strategy users now switches to R strategy till the payoff
of all the strategy equalizes. Due to this in new equilibrium
D strategy users increases, C strategy users decreases and R
strategy users remains same as shown in figure 1b.
The reasoning behind second observation is that as the ‘ben-
efit of reputation increment’ β increases the payoff to R and
C strategy users increases whereas the payoff to D strategy
users remains same due to this D strategy users switches
to R and C strategy users. As the fraction of D strategy
users decreases and fraction of R strategy users increases the
benefit of payment to R strategy users decreases so they also
switches to C strategy users. This whole process continues till
the payoff to all three strategies equalizes. This results in the
increment to the C strategy fraction and decrement in the R
and D strategy fraction of population.
The reasoning behind third observation is that as the ‘initial
payment’ p increases the payoff to R strategy users increases
whereas the payoff to C and D strategy users decreases. Due
to this the C and D strategy users switches to R strategy
users. As R strategy users increases the payoff to C strategy
increases due to this R strategy users switches to C strategy
users till the payoff to all three strategies equalizes. This
process results in increment in the fraction of C strategy,
decrement in the fraction of D strategy and remain same in
the fraction of R strategy.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3: Fraction of population in mixed Nash equilibrium for
the network (a) vs benefit of reputation increment β with other
parameters {p = 0.5, α = 2, a = 3, d = 8} (b) vs cost of
sharing a with other parameters {p = 0.5, α = 2, d = 8, β =
4} (c) vs round based initial payment p with other parameters
{α = 2, a = 3, d = 8, β = 4} (d) vs cost of reputation
calculation α with other parameters {p = 0.5, a = 3, d = 8,
β = 4}
The reasoning behind fourth observation is that as the ‘cost
of sharing’ a increases the payoff to C strategy users and R
strategy users decreases and payoff to D strategy users remains
constant. This results in switching of C and R strategy users
to D strategy. As the fraction of C strategy users decreases
this results in the decrement the payoff to D strategy users and
increment the payoff to R strategy users as they are getting
benefit from initial payment. So now the users switch to R
strategy users till the payoff to all three strategies equalizes
and in new equilibrium fraction of the D and R strategy users
increases whereas the fraction of C strategy users decreases.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF
REPUTATION GAME
All the above three explained system model is analyzed
by simulation as well. By simulation, we have shown the
final evolution of the system. The simulation experiments
have been conducted for 10000 nodes. We assume the fully
connected topology of the network in which any two peer
in the network can interact with each other at random in a
large and well-mixed population. On the part of each user,
system constitutes three strategy viz. R (Reputation calculation
with cooperation), C (Cooperation) and D (Defection). To
show the relationship between the final evolved fraction and
the initial fraction of different strategy users, we have taken
different initial fractions of population for different strategy
users and plotted their evolution separately. The evolution
process contains the repetition of three phases viz. selection
phase, transaction phase and reproduction phase. Initially each
node selects any of the other node for pairwise interaction with
equal probability so the probability that user will interact with
any other strategy user is the fraction of that strategy users in
the population. This phase is called selection phase. After this
phase each node simultaneously calculates its payoff using the
utility function based on game. This phase is called transaction
phase. After each transaction, there is a reproduction phase in
which all users imitate any other strategy with the probability
proportional to the difference between the strategy’s expected
payoff and the population expected payoff. In our system
model we assume that each node has the knowledge of all
his neighbor’s payoff and strategy. So the nodes adopts a new
strategy according to the natural selection. For the simulation
we also chooses the parameter values viz. d (benefit of
sharing), a (cost of sharing), α (cost of reputation calculation),
β (benefit of reputation increment) and p (initial payment). In
the selection of the parameter values we follow constraints
that is necessary and sufficient for modeling this game viz.
the ‘cost of sharing’ a should always be less than or equal to
the ‘benefit of the shared resources’ d and greater than ‘cost of
reputation calculation’ α. We have examined these parameters
for different values in ordinal fashion and observed that final
evolution is still same.
A. First Reputation Game
1) Reputation cost α negligible: In first scenario we have
taken α negligible. We run our simulation for different initial
fractions of R, C and D strategies and fixed parameter values
(d = 8, a = 3, β = 4, α = 0). Figure 4a and 4b shows that
the final fraction of R and C strategy depends on the initial
fraction of the strategies, which substantiate the theoretical
analysis of the first game. We observe that as αa is zero so
the payoff to R strategy users is greater than the payoff to C
strategy until D strategy user’s fraction are greater than zero
and becomes equal to the payoff of C strategy users when
all D strategy users dies out. At first we run the simulation
with 0.1, 0.2, 0.7 fraction of R, C and D strategies users
respectively (figure 4a). As mentioned earlier, in the selection
phase user selects other user with equal probability so the
probability that it will meet with R strategy users is 0.1, with
C strategy users is 0.2 and with D strategy users is 0.7. Then
in transaction phase each node simultaneously calculates the
payoff. Node selects other strategy with probability propor-
tional to the difference between his neighbor’s payoff and his
payoff. Each node imitates to the higher payoff strategy with
positive probability. In this scenario initially as xR < ad+β i.e.,
0.1 < 0.25 and xR >
a(xR+xC)+α
d+β i.e., 0.1 > 0.075 , results
in the expected payoff order as PR > PD > PC , so C strategy
imitates to D and R strategy whereas D strategy imitates to
R strategy. This results in increment in the R strategy and D
strategy fraction and decrement in C strategy fraction initially.
As the fraction of R strategy users increases and becomes
greater than 0.25, then the expected payoff of D strategy users
comes to lower than C strategy users which results in payoff
order as PR > PC > PD and so from now D strategy users
imitates to R and C strategy, and C strategy users imitates to
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 4: Round vs Fraction of population for the network with
d=8, a=3, β = 4, p = 0.5, α = 0
only R strategy. This results in increment to R and C strategy
users whereas decrement in D strategy fraction. After this as
D strategy fraction becomes zero which is equal to αa , then the
payoff order becomes PR = PC > PD which further results
in constant fraction of all three strategies. We observe that in
this scenario as discussed in the model 1, in final evolution
system composed with only R and C strategy users as in
figure 4a. After this we run the simulation with 0.1, 0.7, 0.2
initial fraction of R, C and D strategies users respectively
(figure 4b). The same process as of explained earlier again
happens but in this scenario the fraction of C strategy users
are almost greater than 0.35 when the fraction of R strategy
becomes greater than ad+β . So in final evolution again there
is only R and C strategy but in this C strategy users are
higher than previous. In third initial setting, we took very less
R and C user fraction i.e., 0.002 and 0.001 respectively and
we observe that C strategy dies out before the fraction of R
strategy becomes greater than ad+β so only R strategy users
remains in the final evolution. With this simulation scenario,
it can be observed that as a(xR+xC)+αd+β is zero when all the
population imitates to D strategy, therefore the payoff of R
and D strategy is equal when xR, xC = 0 and xD = 1. As
xR slightly increases, the payoff of R strategy users becomes
greater than D strategy users and D strategy users imitates
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5: Round vs Fraction of population for the network with
d=8, a=3, β = 4, α = 2
to R strategy as in figure 4c and 4d that even with very
small initial fraction from mutation, R strategy is there in the
final evolution. In figure 4c, 4d and 4e with initial R strategy
fraction as 0.002, 0.005 and 0.0005 respectively, it can also be
observed that as the initial fraction of R strategy decreases, the
final evolution time of the system increases. In figure 4f from
beginning, the fraction of D strategy users decrease because
from beginning initial fraction of R strategy remains greater
than 0.25 value.
2) Reputation cost α is not negligible: In the second
scenario α is not negligible. Results of this scenario also
substantiate the theoretical results of Game 1. First we have
taken the fraction of different strategies as 0.6, 0.2, 0.2 fraction
of R, C and D strategies users respectively as shown in figure
5a. Initially when the R strategy users are more than ad+β and
a(xR+xC)+α
d+β , and D strategy users are lesser than
α
a so the
order of expected payoff becomes PC > PR > PD. Due
to this initially R strategy users imitates to C strategy users
whereas D strategy users imitates to R and C strategy users.
The fraction of R strategy users increases till the expected
payoff of R strategy remains greater than the expected payoff
of population. This is the point where xR > αα+xD(d+β−a) i.e.,
0.61. After this point as the fraction of R strategy decreases
and comes to lower than ad+β i.e., 0.25, then the expected
payoff order becomes PD > PC > PR so now R strategy
users start to imitate to both C and D strategy users as shown
in figure 5a. At this point as C strategy users are more than
70% and D strategy users are lesser than 10% so R strategy
users interacts with more C strategy users and so they imitates
to more C strategy users. This continues till the expected
payoff of C strategy users is greater than the expected payoff
of the population which is the point where xR > a(d+β−a)+ αxD
.
After this point more R and C strategy imitates to D strategy
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6: Round vs Fraction of population for the network with
parameter values (a) d = 4, a = 2.5, β = 3, α = 2 (b) d = 6,
a = 2.5, β = 3, α = 2 (c) d = 6, a = 5, β = 3, α = 4 (d)
d = 8, a = 5, β = 1, α = 2
and so C strategy users also decrease and in final evolution
all population imitates to the D strategy. After this we run
the simulation with 0.9, 0.05, 0.05 initial fraction of R, C and
D strategies users respectively (figure 5b). In this simulation
D strategy users almost dies out before the fraction of R
strategy users comes to lower than ad+β and only C strategy
users remained in the system. As system consist of most of C
strategy users, the payoff of D strategy again start to increase
but for some time until some user mutate to D strategy only
C strategy remains in the system. As mutation takes place and
some users mutates to D strategy, C strategy users also start
to imitate D strategy and finally D strategy invades whole
the population. After this we also run the simulation with two
more different initial fraction and we found the same evolution
in the system as in figure 5c and 5d. We also run the simulation
with different parameter for the same initial fraction (0.4, 0.4
and 0.2 of R, C and D respectively). At first simulation we
took d = 4, a = 2.5, β = 3 and α = 2. In this setting
initially as the R strategy users are more than ad+β i.e., 0.35
and lesser than a(xR+xC)+αd+β , and D strategy users are lesser
than αa , so expected payoff order becomes PC > PD > PR.
Due to this R strategy users imitates to C and D strategy
users. As R strategy users decreases and comes to lower than
0.35, the payoff to D strategy users becomes greater than C
strategy users and so C strategy users also start to imitate to
D strategy users due to this C strategy users start to decrease.
In this way the final evolution reaches with all D strategy
users in the population. In second simulation we increases
the value of parameter d to 6. We found that now in this
setting initially more R strategy users imitates to C strategy,
as now the ad+β is 0.27 which is more lesser than xR than
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 7: Round vs Fraction of population with corresponding
varying payment vs time for the network with d = 8, a = 3,
β = 4, α = 2
previous and so the rate of imitation is more than previous,
but again in final evolution all users imitates to D strategy.
In third simulation we increases both cost of sharing a and
cost of reputation calculation α to 5 and 4 respectively. Due
to this the increment in C strategy population stops early from
previous and users start to imitate to D strategy earlier than
previous setting. In fourth setting as we decreases the benefit
of reputation increment the C strategy users start to decrease
earlier than previous setting. We found that even with different
parameter setting the final evolution is same.
B. Numerical Analysis of Second Reputation Game
In first simulation scenario, round based initial payment p
varies according to equation 11 for different initial fractions
of strategies. We observe that when D strategy users are more,
then less p is required and as D strategy users decreases,
p increases, this is due to the fact that as D strategy users
are more, then p is distributed among less users. Although
initial payment in the defection free population is high but this
initial payment is given back to the users during redistribution.
The initial payment is not distributed back only to the users
who defects and their part is distributed among the users who
cooperates in the form of reward. First we run the simulation
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Fig. 8: Round vs Fraction of population with corresponding
varying payment vs time for the network with d = 8, a = 2.5,
β = 4, α = 2
with fraction 0.05, 0.3 and 0.65 of R, C and D strategy
as shown in figure 7a. As in this game if xD > αa then
PR > PC and initially the fraction of D strategy users
are almost equal to αa i.e., 0.66, therefore the payoff to C
strategy users are almost equal to R strategy users. Also as
if xR >
a(1−xD)+α− p1−xD
d+β then PR > PD and initially xR
is greater than
a(1−xD)+α− p1−xD
d+β i.e 0.05 > 0.02. Due to
this the order of expected payoff becomes PC > PR > PD
and D strategy users imitates to R and C strategy. Therefore
initially R and C both strategy users increase but as D strategy
users fraction decreases and p increases then the fraction
a(1−xD)+α− p1−xD
d+β increases and at point when xD becomes
0.25 than xR comes to lower than this fraction and so from
now the expected payoff of D strategy users becomes greater
than R strategy users and so R strategy users also start to
imitate to D and C strategy users. This process continues and
in final evolution all users imitates to C strategy. The same
process repeats in other two evolution with initial fraction 0.6,
0.05 and 0.35 of R, C and D strategy respectively as shown
in figure 7b, and with initial fraction 0.025, 0.025 and 0.95
of R, C and D strategy respectively as shown in figure 7c.
In second simulation scenario the round based initial payment
fulfills the condition 12. This evolution is same as first game
evolution figure 5.
C. Numerical Analysis of Third Reputation Game
In this simulation scenario round based initial payment is
varied according to equation 23. First we run the simulation
for different initial fraction. At first we took fraction 0.002, 0.3
and 0.698 of R, C and D strategy respectively. As initially R
strategy users are lesser than ad+β so the payoff order becomes
PR > PD > PC . But as D strategy are more so C strategy
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 9: Round vs Fraction of population for the network with
parameter values (a) d = 8, a = 7.5, β = 4, α = 1 (b) d = 8,
a = 3, β = 4, α = 2.5 (c) d = 8, a = 7.5, β = 4, α = 3 (d)
d = 8, a = 7.5, β = 4, α = 5
users interact more D strategy users and so they imitates
to more D strategy users initially. But as R strategy users
population increases, then D strategy payoff start to decrease
as p is distributed among only R strategic users so they got
higher payoff than C and D strategy users and so C and D
strategy users imitates to R strategy users. In this scenario
p varies according to the fraction of R strategy users so the
payoff also varies accordingly. This results in getting more
payoff to R strategic users as they are getting higher payoff
from C strategy in the form of initial payment distribution.
This process continues and in final evolution all population
converges to all the R strategy users as shown in figure 8b.
We run the second simulation with 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3 fraction
of R, C and D strategy as shown in figure 8c. In this fraction
as R strategy users are greater than ad+β so D strategy users
does not get better payoff and so both D and C strategy users
imitates to R strategy. This process continues and in final
evolution again all population converges to all R strategy users
as in figure 8c.
Now we fix the initial fraction to 0.4,0.3 and 0.3 for R,
C and D respectively and varies the parameter values as in
figure 9. We observe that as the difference between d and a
increases, D strategy reduction rate increases and C strategy
reduction rate decrease as shown in figure 9a, 9b. This is
because, with the increment of this difference C strategy users
payoff increases. We observed that when the number of R
strategy users are less in the population then less p is required
for motivating the players to imitate R strategy. But as number
of R strategy users becomes more, more p required which
is redistributed among these R strategy users. Therefore the
contribution of this varying round based initial payment is that,
when the system consists of only R strategy users, then the
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value of p will be α which is distributed back to all the R
strategy users and so no burden of the initial payment because
whatever they are paying, they are getting the same. But as any
player defects then he will not get his part and also his part is
distributed among other R strategy users. So this mechanism
is punishing users who are not calculating reputation as well
as rewarding the R strategy users.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In our analysis we have observed that if varying round based
initial payment is distributed among R strategy users then R
strategy is evolutionary stable. In this analysis R strategy users
fully cooperates with cooperating users and fully defects with
defectors. But as the reputation of users may be in analog
form and not in binary form [19], the reputation strategy
should be modified accordingly. With this setting of the game,
we would have the continuum of the pure strategies with all
the varying level. This setting of the game would allow us
to study more practical reputation system based peer-to-peer
network. Furthermore the payment distribution mechanism and
recognition of reputation calculator users would also needs to
be further investigated. In future a reputation system may be
built that will overcome these limitations.
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyse the reputation game in peer-to-peer network and
found that without any additional incentive, reputation strategy
is not an evolutionary stable strategy. In systems, where repu-
tation strategy is used for promoting the cooperation, even on
these systems, reputation is not an evolutionary stable strategy.
For making the reputation strategy as evolutionary stable
strategy first varying round based initial payment has to be
incorporated and then this initial payment should be distributed
among R strategy users. We also analysed a game in which
varying initial payment is to be distributed among C and R
strategy users and in that game cooperation strategy would
be an evolutionary stable strategy for varying initial payment.
We also found that whether a number of different strategies
has been found for stopping free-riding using reputation, but
reputation alone is not an evolutionary stable strategy.
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